"To my knowledge, there has never [before] been a volume that analyzes, in one place, the actual language of science--those elements of thinking that are acknowledged to be the basis of scientific thought. . . . [Thus] this is a very important book, contributing to several fields: science, education, rhetoric, medicine, and perhaps even philosophy. . . . Darian's erudition is truly astonishing." --Celest A. Martin, Associate Professor, College Writing Program, University of Rhode Island From astronomy to zoology, the (...) practice of science proceeds from scientific ways of thinking. These patterns of thought, such as defining and classifying, hypothesizing and experimenting, form the building blocks of all scientific endeavor. Understanding how they work is therefore an essential foundation for everyone involved in scientific study or teaching, from elementary school students to classroom teachers and professional scientists. In this book, Steven Darian examines the language of science in order to analyze the patterns of thinking that underlie scientific endeavor. He draws examples from university science textbooks in a variety of disciplines, since these offer a common, even canonical, language for scientific expression. Darian identifies and focuses in depth on nine patterns--defining, classifying, using figurative language, determining cause and effect, hypothesizing, experimenting, visualizing, quantifying, and comparing--and shows how they interact in practice. He also traces how these thought modes developed historically from Pythagoras through Newton. (shrink)

A concept of merit is used for spiritual accounting in many religious traditions, seemingly a substantial point of connection between religion and ordinary morality. Teachings of “merit transfer” (as in Buddhism and Roman Catholicism) might make us doubt this connection since they violate the principle that merit must be earned. If we examine the structure of ordinary schemes of desert, however, we find that personal worth is posited for a variety of reasons; the basic requirement in this realm is not (...) earning by individuals but rather a community’s program for cultivating desirable collaboration among its members. There are strong enough parallels between religiously envisioned merit transfer and socially normal conferrals and sharings of worth that we can conclude that the religious posits of transferred merit are indeed comprehensible as merit, whatever other problems of comprehensibility they pose. (shrink)

Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. (...) Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction. (shrink)

In numerous essays over the years, and most recently in his Meaning, Paul Horwich has worked to articulate and defend a version of the use theory of meaning. At the heart of his project is the idea that the meaning of a word is constituted by a regularity in speakers’ use of it — i.e., by a regularity in speakers’ dispositions to accept as true, to reject as false, or neither to accept nor to reject sentences containing it. A ‘use (...) regularity,’ thus construed, is a dispositional acceptance property distinctive of a particular word and, derivatively, of sentences containing the word. For example, the use regularity constituting the meaning of ‘red’ can be very roughly characterized as speakers’ disposition to accept the application of ‘red’ to observed surfaces if and only if they are clearly red. Of course, the use regularity constituting the meaning of a word can be described in different ways; in particular, in describing a use regularity we might merely mention, and not use, the corresponding word. Furthermore, not every regularity in the use of a word is meaning-constituting. The use regularity that constitutes the meaning of the word ‘tall,’ for example, does so in virtue of the fact that, taken together with general psychological laws and the use regularities governing other words, it is basic to the explanation of speakers’ overall pattern of use of ‘tall.’ Hence, a central claim of Horwich’s use theory is that linguistic use is in general to be ‘unified and explained in terms of a relatively small and simple body of factors and principles including, for each word, a basic use regularity’. (shrink)

The transactivation response‐DNA binding protein of 43 kDa (TDP‐43) is an aggregation‐prone nucleic acid‐binding protein linked to the etiology of Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration (FTLD). These conditions feature the accumulation of insoluble TDP‐43 aggregates in the neuronal cytoplasm that lead to cell death. The dynamics between cytoplasmic and nuclear TDP‐43 are altered in the disease state where TDP‐43 mislocalizes to the cytoplasm, disrupting Nuclear Pore Complexes (NPCs), and ultimately forming large fibrils stabilized by the C‐terminal prion‐like (...) domain. Here, we review three emerging and poorly understood aspects of TDP‐43 biology linked to its aggregation. First, how post‐translational modifications in the proximity of TDP‐43 N‐terminal domain (NTD) promote aggregation. Second, how TDP‐43 engages FG‐nucleoporins in the NPC, disrupting the pore permeability and function. Third, how the importin α/β heterodimer prevents TDP‐43 aggregation, serving both as a nuclear import transporter and a cytoplasmic chaperone. (shrink)

A comprehensive look at how we rely on ideals of worthy action in the pursuit of moral happiness.

General intelligence is success in comprehensive life- and world-modelling. What counts as intelligent will depend on what an individual or society thinks about life, world, and success. Yet intelligence comparisons have a basis in direct experience of mental encounter; they arise in sensed resemblances among subjects (liable, like other human-kinds perceptions, to stereotyping). Intelligence is assessed differently according to different scenarios of encounter, as for example among workers, traders, lovers, philosophers, or friends. An IQ score could not define a personal (...) intelligence kind, but it could reasonably affect one subject's approach to another in standardized and time-limited situations. (shrink)

Discussable issues lurk amidst the sprawling variety of "heaven" conceptions in different traditions. To advance reflection on heaven thinking, this paper concentrates on the question of what makes for a best world and orders possible heavens according to alternative resolutions of space, time and causality. Some apparent strengths and weaknesses of each type are examined. It is suggested that the proposed heavens of most durable interest will be those representing the most amazing combinations of possibilities, while the most productive discussions (...) of heaven-related issues will be those best able to refer to conditions of goodness in the actual world. (shrink)

An original metaphysical proposal building on classical and contemporary sources. In Centering and Extending, Steven G. Smith retrieves and refashions some of the best ideas of classical and early modern metaphysics to support insight into the natures of mental and material beings and their relations. Avoiding what he critiques as distortive paths of idealism, materialism, repressive monism, and overly permissive pluralism, Smith builds his framework on centering and extending as universal principles of formation. Identifying the basic consistency of being (...) with these principles in symmetrical partnership enables a naturalist process view that, unlike Whitehead’s, does not overbalance toward the subjective and teleological and, unlike Deleuze and Guattari’s, does not overbalance toward the material and chaotic. This view supports useful conceptions of mind and matter, form and energy, reason and cause, and a layered world order without relying on a blind concept of supervenience or emergence. It also respects and reinforces a division of roles between metaphysical sense-making and spiritual determinations of meaningfulness. Steven G. Smith is Jennie Carlisle Golding Professor of Philosophy at Millsaps College. He is the author of several books, including Worth Doing, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Although Emmanuel Levinas later expressed regret that he sided with Martin Heidegger rather than the more “ideal”-minded Ernst Cassirer in their 1929 Davos encounter, Cassirer’s philosophy of culture would never have been an apt framework for Levinas’s own project, which was always directed more to fundamental orientation than to formative activities or achievements. In “Meaning and Sense” (1964), Levinas conceived a totalizing cultural “meaning” as a foil to transcendent ethical “sense.” In a 1983 paper, however, he proposed an ethical conception (...) of culture. He could have developed this further using another element from “Meaning and Sense,” an ethical conception of work as service of the Other. The work-in-progress of culture combines pure ethics and implemented morality, pure command and consistent style, infinite vulnerability and actual power. (shrink)

This study examines developments in Karl Barth's early theology (to 1932) and Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy (as far as Otherwise than Being) to show how the concept of the Totally Other addresses the most radical problem of justification for theological and philosophical thought.

Transition to Real Analysis with Proof provides undergraduate students with an introduction to analysis including an introduction to proof. The text combines the topics covered in a transition course to lead into a first course on analysis. This combined approach allows instructors to teach a single course where two were offered. The text opens with an introduction to basic logic and set theory, setting students up to succeed in the study of analysis. Each section is followed by graduated exercises that (...) both guide and challenge students. The author includes examples and illustrations that appeal to the visual side of analysis. The accessible structure of the book makes it an ideal refence for later years of study or professional work. (shrink)

In this book, Steven G. Smith focuses on the guidance function in language and scripture and evaluates the assumptions and ideals of scriptural religion in global perspective. He brings to language studies a new pragmatic emphasis on the shared modeling of life-in-the-world by communicators constantly depending on each other's guidance. Using concepts of axiality and axialization derived from Jaspers' description of the 'Axial Age', he shows the essential role of scripture in the historical progress of communicative action. This volume (...) clarifies the formative power of scriptures in religions of the 'world religion' type and brings scripture into philosophy of religion as a major cross-cultural category of study, thereby helping philosophy of religion find a needed cross-cultural footing. (shrink)

Our moral valuation of nonhuman and human beings alike may arise in sympathy, the realization in feeling of a significant commonality between self and others; in scrupulous observance of policy, the affirmation in practical consistency of a system of relations with others; and in piety, the attitude of boundless appreciation and absolute scruple with respect to objects as sacred - that is, as valued for the sake of adequate valuation of the holy. Differences between the moral status of humans and (...) that of nonhumans are to be explained not by any single criterion such as the capacity to suffer or to make contracts, but rather by finding the relative positions of humans and nonhumans on continua of feelable commonality, policy considerateness, and sacredness. Investigation of these differences must take into account the way basic religious apprehensions (or the absence thereof) organize these frames of reference. (shrink)

The sense of a religious life ideal typically depends on an ordinary practical understanding of selfhood and success (worthiness) that it both departs from (toward a higher excellence) and trades on. Serenity and passion are examined as ways of transmuting ordinary trying and worth.

For perspicuous comparison and evaluation of moral positions on life-and-death issues, it is necessary to take into account the different meanings that killing and getting killed can bear in the two dimensions of dealing with persons (intention meeting intention) and handling them. A homicidal scenario in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight shows the possibility of courteous dealing coinciding with lethal handling. The extreme possibility of lovingly affirming persons while killing them, suggested by the Augustinian “kindly severity” ideal for state-sponsored (...) punitive killing, requires the killers’ affirmation of a fleshliness and fallibility shared with their victims; but love can accept killing only provisionally, since it postulates freedom from the constraints that are felt to require killing. (shrink)

Kant’s central notion of a “causality of freedom” seems inconsistent with his theoretical analysis of causation. Because of its detachment from any reference to time, it is also seriously in tension with ordinary moral ideals of individuality, efficacy, responsiveness, and personal growth in the exercise of freedom. I suggest a way of conceiving moral freedom that avoids the absurdity of practical timelessness while preserving the main strengths of Kant’s theories of theoretical and practical meaning, including his refusal to specify the (...) content of human fulfillment. Much as Kant’s ideal of the highest good combines the supreme good of moral virtue with its necessarily desired complement of worthy happiness, a Kantian ideal of the fullest freedom can combine the transcendental freedom of the moral disposition with individual exercises of freedom in the dramatic interaction of actual moral community. (shrink)

Mark Blaug's contributions to economics were many and significant. This essay provides a review of Mark Blaug: Rebel with Many Causes, edited by Marcel Boumans and Matthias Klaes, which collects papers from a set of conferences organized in Blaug's memory.

A fraughtness in the human communicative situation—the impossibility of assuring collegial equality in our presentations to each other, given that we are striving to control each other’s attention—is compellingly figured in the treatment of the focus plane of show entertainment in film musicals. In Busby Berkeley’s seminal work in 42nd Street (1933), the portrait of the Great Showman in The Great Ziegfeld (1936), and Brian De Palma’s satirical Phantom of the Paradise (1974) it may be seen that the show musical (...) genre has a distinctive preoccupation with the focus plane of performance and constructs this place of encounter as fraught—in the sense not only that characters are shown in possibly untenable positions but that viewers are made to recognize that they might be in an untenable relationship with the performers and makers of the shows they are looking at. (shrink)

If, as many historians and theorists now believe, narrative is the form proper to historical explanation, this raises the problem of the terms in which such narratives are to be evaluated. Without a clear account of evaluation, the status of historical knowledge remains obscure. Beginning with the view, found in Hayden White and others, that historical narrative constitutes a meaning not reducible to the factual content it engages, this essay argues that such meaning can arise only through a synthesis of (...) cognitive and normative discourses. Narrative combines "heterogeneous" language games in such a way that neither appeal to "truth content" nor to "justice" suffices to decide the question of which of two competing historical explanations is, as a whole, superior. Examining in critical detail the opposed positions on this issue articulated by two recent theorists-Frank Ankersmit and David Carr -the paper concludes that the debate between those who hold that historical narratives should be judged in essentially cognitive terms and those who hold that they should be judged in essentially political terms cannot be resolved and that a philosophical view of historical narrative that is neither realist nor idealist needs to be developed. (shrink)

Some of kant's rationales for conceiving the highest good of morality as virtue rewarded with happiness rest on the subject's "necessary" natural desire for happiness, While others appeal to a still-Obscure principle of moral desert. The principle, I argue, Is that the moral agent qua moral necessarily hopes for the "approval" of fellow moral legislators and god, Who "would" (did they exist, And if they could) signify their approval by bestowing the means of happiness.

Influential moral theories keyed to benevolence (including Mengzi’s and Hutcheson’s) claim a footing for ideal moral benevolence in natural human benevolence. The meaning of this claim depends on how natural and ideal benevolence are conceived and how the two are supposed to be related—as Mengzi suggests, for example, that there is an innate “sprout” of compassionate aversion to suffering that tends to grow into moral humaneness. In any case it is plausible that some sort of spontaneous and consistent human friendliness (...) supports a moral standard of unselfish concern for the well-being of others. The premise of benevolence theory is strengthened when we take account of a largely overlooked form of general good will: benevolent interest in the efforts of others. Here too a form of moral benevolence may grow from a base in natural good will, a point anticipated in Aristotle’s observation that our friendly interest in others is stimulated by the contestants in sports events. The sports spectator act of “pulling for” contestants, though conflicted by competition and exploited for various nonmoral satisfactions, is a vivid specimen of a general pulling for all innocent efforts in an inclusive moral fellowship of triers. (shrink)

How can we take history seriously as real and relevant? Despite the hazards of politically dangerous or misleading accounts of the past, we live our lives in a great network of cooperation with other actors; past, present, and future. We study and reflect on the past as a way of exercising a responsibility for shared action. In each of the chapters of Full History Smith poses a key question about history as a concern for conscious participants in the sharing of (...) action, starting with “What Is Historical Meaningfulness?” and ending with “How Can History Have an Aim?” Constructing new models of historical meaning while engaging critically with perspectives offered by Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Heidegger, Eliade, Sartre, Foucault, and Arendt, Smith develops a philosophical account of thinking about history that moves beyond postmodernist skepticism. Full History seeks to expand the cast of significant actors, establishing an inclusive version of the historical that recognizes large-scale cumulative actions but also encourages critical revision and expansion of any paradigm of shared action. (shrink)

This paper uses the humor of Road Runner cartoons as a test of our intuitions about causality as these intuitions are appealed to by the rival theories of Hume and Kant. I argue that Road Runner cartoons are funnier to Kantians, with their stronger presumption of necessary causal regularity, and therefore supportive of Kantianism to the degree that we find this humor compelling.

Based on a bold equation of cinema with history, Jean-Luc Godard’s essay-film Histoire du Cinéma provokes new thoughts about what historical understanding involves and how cinematic revelation can happen. This paper discusses how Histoire engages conventional standards of historical understanding while also taking us into uncharted depths of historical realization, examining the undeniable historical evidence presented in the film, undismissable insights into relations among historical data, and possibly valid judgments of historical truth. Reaching for non-obvious connections, Godard risks misleading decontextualization (...) of his materials. But by stocking our minds with pertinent film selections, new treatments of those images, and various writers’ musings he draws us into his quest for a practically decisive realization of the significance of the recent history of our civilization. (shrink)

Elucidation of the epistemic fulfillment of "realizing" in imaginative, intellectual, and spiritual modes.

ABSTRACT To understand the internal structure of moral positions and the nature of moral disagreements, it would be useful to have a “moral sense” model of our different types of moral sensitivity, from our relatively spontaneous friendliness to our appreciation for traditional community norms, ideal ethical norms, and spiritual appeals to ultimate concern. After the first round of modern moral sense theory in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Edwards, most discussions of the moral sense concept have centered on general theses about moral (...) value (objective or subjective, rational or emotional) without attending to this complexity. Even though the familiar positions in these discussions are not reconcilable on the plane of ethical theory, they need not be seen as simply antagonistic. Working with clearly differentiated senses of both “moral” and “sense,” this article refashions “moral sense theory” as a way of placing the insights of the classic moral sense theories, ethical rationalism, and a distinctly spiritual sensibility in a conceptually stable and empirically more discriminating order. The article also suggests strengthening the realist premise of moral sensing by invoking the model of a game player’s operational sense of how things are going in pursuit of a game’s objectives. (shrink)